Foundation

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Steve Dekorte

Subject: Epistemology
Position: Empiricist, naturalistically grounded
Nuance: Refuses demands for guarantees the universe doesn't provide; "real at its level" claims are cashed out in observable patterns and predictive structure rather than frame-independent foundations. The framework's own foundation is self-supporting in a circular but non-vicious way; empiricism is justified by its track record, which is itself an empirical claim, treated as a feature rather than a bug.
Notes: Scope-discipline (claims carry explicit scope conditions and known failure modes at scope boundaries) is a direct consequence: empirical evaluability requires determinate predictions, which require specified scope. The recurring level-relative moves elsewhere in the framework (free will, identity, moral status, meaning, rights) inherit their legitimacy from this constraint.

Subject: Informational monism
Position: Epistemic, not metaphysical; deflationary about "material"
Nuance: Direct experience is informational; "material substrate" is a label for reliably cohering and predictive patterns within the information rather than an additional posit. Position is deflationary about the regularity itself, refusing the question rather than answering it, but the reframe has consequences for what kinds of explanation are even available.
Notes: Several traditional puzzles may be artifacts of the substrate framing rather than genuine puzzles in the informational one: physics becomes about the structure of the regularities (cf. informational/relational interpretations of QM); the hard problem of consciousness partly dissolves because the substrate-to-experience gap disappears; fine-tuning puzzles reframe as questions about the structure of accessible information rather than selection over substrates; scientific progress is finding more compressible and predictive descriptions of the regularity rather than peeling back to substrate. Lineage parallel to Hume's bundle theory, Mach's neutral monism, Wheeler's "it from bit."

Subject: "Real at its level" claims
Position: Scope-disciplined level-relativism
Nuance: A level-relative claim is legitimate when it carries explicit scope conditions and produces predictions that hold within that scope; it becomes vacuous or dishonest when smuggled across scales. Flat-earth-at-daily-experience is valid for local navigation, invalid for transoceanic flight; the error is scope violation, not the level-relative claim itself.
Notes: The framework's recurring "real at its level" moves (free will, identity, moral status, meaning, rights) are protected from vacuity by the requirement that each comes with a specified scope and known failure conditions at scope boundaries. The duplication case for identity and the cross-scale dissolution of meaning are examples of explicit scope-boundary acknowledgment rather than evasions.